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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of the South African National School
Nutrition Programme on nutritional outcomes using a regression discon-
tinuity design applied to the first wave of the National Income Dynamic
Study. There is tentative evidence to suggest that the programme has a
positive effect on weight-for-age and BMI-for-age z-scores, but data con-
straints necessitating the employment of a proxy selection variable and
potentially unobserved discontinuity in other variables around the cut-
off call into question the validity of the identification strategy. As such,
these results should be interpreted with caution. The paper also serves to
communicate ideas for identification strategies and estimation techniques
that are conditional on the imminent release of new data, and also aims to
communicate relevant aspects of funding and nutrition policy that could
inform further attempts at rigorously investigating the National School
Nutrition Programme.
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1 Introduction
Poor educational and nutritional outcomes are a serious impediment to eco-
nomic growth and undermine legislatively enshrined national objectives of so-
cial inequality redress, wealth redistribution and access to basic human rights.
One of the measures adopted by the South African government, with the aim
of combating these outcomes, is the adoption the National School Nutrition
Programme (NSNP). The NSNP provides school-based meals and encourages
participants to learn about nutrition and sustainable food cultivation. The basic
idea is that school-based feeding programmes increase alertness and the ability
to concentrate in class by giving learners the energy they need to do so, improves
enrolment and attendance as children are incentivised to obtain their free daily
meal, or some combination of the two.
The NSNP draws considerable funding in South Africa, despite little hard
evidence of its impact on nutrition, educational achievement or school participa-
tion. This paper has multiple components which coalesce towards the ultimate
goal of rigorously assessing the NSNP in the broadest sense. To clarify, the aim
of this paper is not solely to provide some set of estimates that relate evidence
as on the effectiveness of the programme, but to provide information on the
structure of the policy, the dimensions of the treatment, potential identification
strategy pitfalls and ideas for further analysis pending the release of more data.
This paper also includes its own analysis of the programme, which employs
a regression discontinuity design (RDD) approach. The results of this anal-
ysis tentatively suggest that the programme has a positive, weighted-average
intention-to-treat effect on weight-for-age and BMI-for-age z-scores across all
individuals in a sample of primary school aged children.
That paper commences as follows. Section 2 relates the history of the nu-
trition programme and draws attention to differences between the modern con-
ception of the school based intervention and its ancestor, the PSNP. This part
of the paper contains information on the nuances of the policy that would be of
interest to researchers looking to investigate the programme econometrically, as
it contains details on policy nuances that could be informative in the construc-
tion of identification strategies. Section 3 highlights the need to investigate
the efficacy of NSNP by communicating results that suggests the persistence
of undernutrition and low educational achievement, despite ever increasing in-
vestment in policy designed to combat these problems. It also summarises the
hypothesised benefits of school feeding programmes and past research into sim-
ilar programmes elsewhere.
The paper goes on, in Section 4, to summarise the basics of the RDD, pro-
vides information on the data used (which is drawn from the National Income
Dynamic Study, NIDS) and includes further information on identification strat-
egy. Section 5 contains the results of our RDD estimation and interprets these
results. Finally, Section 6 discusses those results in light of the potential short-
comings of the identification strategy employed and offers several ideas for fur-
ther research pending the release of more data. Section 7 concludes.
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2 History of Interacting Educational and Nutri-
tional Policy
2.1 The Early Years
The South African Primary School Nutrition Programme (PSNP) was first an-
nounced in May 1994 and implemented for the first time in September of the
same year. The first version of the programme was targeted at achieving the
dual developmental objectives of improving the health status and improving
educational outcomes of South African children. It was defined as a compo-
nent of the Integrated Nutrition Programme which was, in turn, defined under
the broad purview of the national Reconstruction and Development Programme
(RDP) (McCoy et al., 1997; Labadarios et al., 2005). The Department of Health
(DoH) held the principle responsibility of administrating the programme, which
included the design of targeting, nutritional, and implementation guidelines
that were then communicated to provincial administrations (Kallmann, 2005).
Provincial departments were then responsible for procurement systems and spe-
cific menu options (Meaker, 2008).
The initial version of the policy was influenced by data suggesting pervasive
undernutrition amongst South African children by illuminating the nature and
scale of the shortfall in the provision of basic human rights1. In an anthropo-
metric survey (the Department of National Health and Population Development
(1994)) of primary school children (n = 97,790), 9.0% were classified as under-
weight2, 2.6% wasted3 and 13.2% stunted4. Not surprisingly, these nutritional
problems were exaggerated within previously disadvantaged racial strata (Mc-
Coy et al., 1997, p. 7).
The decision to introduce a school-based nutrition programme, given these
descriptive data, was heavily nformed by the World Bank’s 1993 World Devel-
opment Report. The document identified school-based health programmes as a
cost effective method of achieving the broad objective of improving disability-
adjusted life years (DALYs)5 (The World Bank, 1993). Particular emphasis was
placed on controlling parasitic worm infections, family planning, nutrition, drug
and alcohol abuse education, improving the environment, HIV/AIDs prevention
and life skills education. Of all of these interventions, as well as the numerous
other peripheral interventions advocated by UNICEF, the United Nations De-
velopment Programme, and other World Bank sources, application of deworm-
1In particular, sections 27, 28, and 29 of the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitu-
tion, which stipulate the inalienable rights of each citizen of South Africa to health care, food,
water and social security (Republic of South Africa, 1996; Public Service Commission, 2008)
2Defined as more than two standard deviations below median in a healthy population,
based on weight-for-age, and implies a mix of chronic and acute malnutrition
3Defined as more than two standard deviations below median in a healthy population,
based on weight-for-height, and implies nutritional stress
4Defined as more than two standard deviations below median in a healthy population,
based on height-for-age, and implies chronic undernutrition
5The DALY represents a measure that expresses years of life lost due to ill-health, disability
or early death (Murray & Lopez, 1997)
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ing medication and micronutrient supplementation (particularly iron, vitamin
A and iodine) were identified as the most cost effective (McCoy et al., 1997,
p. 22-23). These recommendations were explicitly included as official strategic
objectives within the PSNP which include
• the expansion of learning capacity, school attendance and punctuality
through the provision of an early morning snack containing at least 25%
of the recommended daily allowance (RDA) of energy for 7-10 year olds,
and at least 20% of the RDA of energy for 11-14 year olds
• provision of micronutrient supplementation
• facilitation of parasite control/parasite eradication
• education of learners on health and nutrition
2.2 Early Evaluations of the Programme
The PSNP received criticism from several evaluations in its adolescence. The
most notable of these was a qualitative national study of 149 schools by Louw
et al. (2001), which was commissioned by the directorate of nutrition (Labadar-
ios et al., 2005). The study aimed to assess the school feeding programme “in
terms of targeting, coverage, menu options, cost effectiveness, and food qual-
ity and safety (Labadarios et al., 2005, p. 103).” The most notable shortfall
identified by Louw et al. (2001) was the apparent “dilution” caused by the
targeting strategies employed. Provinces were politically motivated to target as
many schools as possible and, in doing so, were forced to spread resources thinly
across included schools. This resulted an underprovision of meals, both in terms
of quantity and quality. School meals were only provided on 80% of school days
in six of the nine provinces, and in eight provinces those meals provided less
than the 20% of the RDA - short of the programme goal of 25%. The main
recommendation of Louw et al. (2001) was to transfer control of the programme
from the DoH to the DoE, as “the DoH was implementing a program in an
environment in which it had a limited mandate (Labadarios et al., 2005).”
To expand on this, the DoH was constructing fairly complex operational
guidelines, that were then open to interpretation by the individual provincial
departments. Critically, there was no national directive determining the target-
ing priorities employed by each of the provinces6 (Kallmann, 2005). Despite this
(and several other problems), there were some anecdotal reports gleaned from
the investigation which suggested that the programme had made some positive
contribution. Children were reported as being more alert and seemed to enjoy
learning/cognitive benefits as a result of the programme.
6These divergent targeting priorities are summarised in Table 3 (Appendix A)
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2.3 Transition
In April 2004, the PSNP was renamed the NSNP and the DoE assumed control
of the programme. This crossover marked a shift in focus from the broad ob-
jectives of the PSNP, which explicitly included improving micronutritional out-
comes and parasite control amongst its objectives, to a policy that was aimed
squarely at improving educational outcomes through protein-energy based nu-
tritional interventions. The list of objectives was whittled down considerably as
a result, and the NSNP now identifies its objectives as
• improving learning capacity
• promoting self-supporting school gardens
• promoting healthy lifestyles among learners (Republic of South Africa,
2009)
Despite discarding the explicit micronutritional objectives of the PSNP in
its official set of objectives, the NSNP still pays some lip-service to micronutri-
tional improvement as a desired objective of the programme in policy documents
and reports detailing its progress. What is also clear, from these reports, is that
school meals, as recently as 2008, are not provided in any uniform way. Further-
more, the administrative and capacity constraints also seem to differ between
various provinces and local governments, creating variation in the extent to
which the programme is rolled out. To provide an example of this variability,
Eastern Cape, Meals: “The provincial department
served only an uncooked menu (bread menu). How-
ever, from July 2008, the PED initiated a pilot project
of a cooked menu in 230 schools, targeting 10 schools
per District. This was progressively increased to 2 031
schools by the end of the 2008/09 financial year. In as-
sessment of the current menu, significant changes will
be necessary in line with prescribed menu options with a
variety of food including fruit and vegetables (Republic
of South Africa, 2008, p. 15).”
Western Cape, Meals: “The PED provided 4 cooked
and 1 uncooked meal per week in line with the prescribed
menu specifications. However there is still room for
improvements in providing a variety of protein sources
such as pilchards or milk as provided in specifications.
Dried vegetables can be substituted with fresh vegeta-
bles because of the higher nutritional value (Republic of
South Africa, 2008, p. 41).”
4
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
These quotes are drawn from reports from each of the PEDs provided to the
central administrators of the NSNP. These reports vary considerably between
all PEDs not only in terms of the nature of the content, but the extent to
which the department communicates any details on the particulars of their roll-
out process. This means that provinces are not only likely to be different, but
we will be unable to check or account for those differences in some cases. This
heterogeneous treatment has implications for the interpretation of the estimated
effects of the programme in the econometric assessment conducted in the latter
part of this paper.
The targeting strategy of the PSNP was also altered considerably after tran-
sition. The previously diverse set of province specific targeting priorities, out-
lined in Table 3, have been simplified. The programme now extends to all
schools identified as being within certain quintiles (as of early 2012, quintiles
one to three in both secondary and primary schools). The way in which these
schools are assigned to these quintiles is detailed in the following section.
2.4 Assigning Schools to Quintiles, the Poverty Score, and
the National Norms and Standards for School Funding
Act (NNSSF)
The quintile assignment procedure is guided by a set of directives outlined within
the National Norms and Standards for School Funding Act (NNSSF). Under the
NNSSF, originally gazetted in 1998 as a component of the South African Schools
Act (SASA), implemented in 2000, and amended on numerous occasions sub-
sequently, each provincial education department (PED) is required to compile
a resource targeting list of schools which is determined by the poverty levels of
the community each school serves. PEDs do this by assigning a poverty score
to each electoral ward which allows them to rank those wards from poorest to
least poor. Resources are then progressively divided based on how that rank-
ing assigns those wards into quintiles. The directives for the calculation of the
poverty score are determined at the national level. These rankings are used to
assign funding and to determine their eligibility for certain pro-poor policies,
amongst which is the NSNP. Schools in the bottom three quintiles have been
designated “no fee schools” as of the 1st of January, 2012 (Republic of South
Africa, Department of Education, 2011).
Previously, the NNSSF allowed PEDs to create their own poverty indices
that were then used to place individual schools into quintiles. The only financial
benchmark imposed was that the allocations to learners in the poorest quintile
must be seven times larger than the allocation to those learners in the wealthiest
one (Wilderman, 2008). Apart from that, provincial departments were largely
independent in terms of their choice of funding allocations between groups.
The policy, as originally conceived, was problematic in that it led to uneven
fund allocation rules and amounts between provinces. Some learners that were
classified as non-poor within certain provinces were receiving more money than
those classified as poor in others. This is because each province was allowed to
5
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set varying funding ratios between quintiles (within the bounds of the lone fi-
nancial benchmark rule). This led to situations in which two learners in different
provinces, who were identical under some other, uniformly applied poverty scale,
were assigned completely different funding allocations. The non-standardisation
of quintile assignment and quintile fund allocation made the initial incarnation
of the NNSSF particularly ill-suited to satisfying the objectives of redress and
redistribution (in the broadest sense) embodied within its parent policy, the
SASA. These problems of inter-provincial inequality were further exacerbated
by large differences in the finance capacity between PEDs (Wilderman, 2008).
The NNSSF received heavy criticism for these shortfalls and, as a result,
a review of the funding policy was commissioned in 2003. The fundamental
concluding recommendation was that school funding norms followed a national
targeting list, and that there be some drive towards ensuring that the bottom
two school quintiles were exempt from school fees.
The amended NNSSF attempted to internalise the recommendations in the
DBE’s “Plan of Action” that was created in response to the 2003 review. Most
notably, the DBE now provides a set of centrally determined principles govern-
ing the determination of the school poverty score. This score is based around
the relative poverty of the surrounding community. The determination of this
measure may employ census or household survey data (from Statistics South
Africa) and is based on income, dependency ratio (unemployment) and edu-
cation levels of the community (literacy rate). In practice, the determination
of poverty scores is done per electoral ward, which are observable in the non-
anonymised version of South African census data. Variables upon which these
poverty scores are calculated are also extracted from that data set. The amended
NNSSF recommends that the basic methods used to determine this score be de-
fined nationally in order to facilitate equal treatment of schools that are within
different provinces (Republic of South Africa, Department of Education, 2006).
There are a few proviso under which PEDs may deviate from the principles
of poverty score calculation outlined above
1. If there are not enough places available in local schools, and the PED has
determined that the community should make use of schools further away.
2. Cases in which local schools are struggling to meet some minimum ob-
jective in terms of quality of teaching and learning to the extent that
less-poor parents are advised to send their children to schools elsewhere.
These conditions can either arise due to acute or chronic issues within the
first-best local school and the suggestion, much like the capacity proviso
outlined previously, hinges on parents sending children to schools outside
their community (Republic of South Africa, Department of Education,
2006).
There are good reasons for including this discretionary component of the
quintile allocation procedure. First, is that schools within electoral wards with
high levels of heterogeneity may appear to be better off than they actually
are. Inequality within wards would raise their mean socioeconomic status, and
6
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the poorer parents (who send their children to local schools) would perhaps
miss out on certain progressive policies because schools within their ward were
misallocated to higher quintiles. Second, if schools in less-poor wards receive an
influx of students from a less-poor ward (because of capacity issues in the ward
from which those children originate, for example) then those learners would
“miss out” on certain treatments and funding allocations (Wilderman, 2008;
Republic of South Africa, Department of Education, 2006).
There is clearly tension between having a transparent, replicable process
of assigning schools to quintiles (on a national level) and ensuring that there
is sufficient manoeuvrability to achieve the intended outcome of progressive
fund allocation. The myriad idiosyncratic characteristics specific to particular
communities, and the households within those communities, mean that it is
impossible to simply eschew any allowance for exceptional circumsta ce, but
means the environment forbids any kind of truly uniform assignment rule.
This is made all the more complicated by the existence of no-fee schools,
which were introduced in 2007. No-fee schools are those that fall into the bot-
tom three quintiles (or the first two quintiles, before January 1st, 2012). These
schools attract the best funding in terms of school safety, nutrition, classroom
construction and Grade R expansion (Wilderman, 2008, p. 6). Following the
introduction of these schools, there was increased competition to be designated
within the bottom two quintiles. Schools that are just on the “wrong side” of
the eligibility cutoff suffer adverse consequences as a result of this demarcation.
To be slightly more succinct, “demarcation changes, the establishment of new
schools, and re-ranking following successful appeals, have pushed out many poor
schools into the less-poor poverty quintiles (Wilderman, 2008, p. 6).” One would
expect that the efficacy of ward administration (at least in terms of capturing
national resource assignments) and the ability to adjure provincial education
departments to define schools within lower quintiles would be correlated with
one another to some extent. This is not to say that the appeal procedure is
corrupt or nepotistic. Rather, the discretionary nature of the allocation means
that differences in ability, in terms of bureaucratic aptitude, rhetoric etc., apply
to a variety of things that could render the provision of public goods within
a ward more or less successful. As such, it is possible that those schools that
are just ineligible for quintile three status (or quintile two status before 2012)
would be disadvantaged in other ways beyond lower non-adjustable per-learner
fund allocations. That is, there could be some selection effect on an electoral
ward basis - wards that get one type of social grant might be more likely to also
be in school quintiles that receive special funding (no-fees, NSNP, and others).
The discretionary approach could also encourage some gaming of the system.
Schools in wards with some political association to those responsible for the
discretionary allocation of schools into quintiles could stand to benefit politi-
cally by ensuring their schools are defined in a way that perpetuates the receipt
of funds. This paper remains agnostic on whether or not this actually occurs,
but the discretionary proviso must be identified as it has strong implications
on the choice of optimal identification strategy for assessing the NSNP, or any
other programme based on these assignments. Summarily, it is possible that
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the combination of discretionary allocation, and the incentives to be included
in lower quintile communities created by well-meaning, progressive policy (that
is targeted on that basis) lead to perverse outcomes that subvert the transfor-
mative objectives of those policies. Any attempts at assessing a South African,
school-based, social programme which is based on quintile assignment need to
be interpreted in this light.
It is also to important to note that there is space in the NNSSF dedicated to
the issues of fee exemptions. Parents may be exempted from paying school fees,
by their School Governing Body (SGB), for a variety of reasons. Automatic
exemptions are given to children that are either orphaned or abandoned, or
receive any other kind of poverty-linked social grant. The calculation for total
or partial exemption for parents is slightly more complicated. These conditional
exemptions are informed by two principles in particular. First, the income
threshold below which parents qualify for total exemption should be the same
within schools, irrespective of the number of children for which those parents
are charged school fees. This is so that it is impossible for similar parents
to have differing exemption status within a school. Second, partial exemption
should depend partly on the number of learners that parent supports. SGBs are
also given license to offer discretionary exemptions, provided that the process is
transparent and equitable (Republic of South Africa, Department of Education,
2006, p. 45).
3 Literature Review
3.1 The Persistence of Undernutrition and Low Educa-
tional Attainment
The same problems of undernutrition in primary school children that origi-
nally motivated the creation of the PSNP are still of concern now. Table 47
summarises the proportion of children that were undernourished according to
various criteria, the details of which are summarised in Table 1 below. These
data were drawn from the first wave of the National Income Dynamic Study
(NIDS) which was conducted throughout 2008 (although primarily in the first
half of the year). The results are alarming, as they suggest that child undernu-
trition problems were either the same or worse in 2008 as they were prior to the
creation of the PSNP8.
The racial and class stratification of undernutrition, particularly stunting,
persist9. Given that public spending on education represents roughly 20% of the
7In Appendix B
8As reflected in data like the Department of National Health and Population Develop-
ment survey, conducted in 1994 (Department of National Health and Population Develop-
ment, 1994), and the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD)
integrated household survey, conducted in 1993 (Ardington & Case, 2008)
9See Table 4 and Figures 5-7 in Appendix B, which provide descriptive statistics and
the kernel density functions of the anthropometric measures by race and income quintile
respectively
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Table 1: Common anthropometric measures Source: Cogill (2003)
Anthropometric
Measure
Term attributed to dan-
gerously low z-scores1
Description
Weight-for-height Wasted Good for measuring acute
malnutrition, low weight-for-
height z-scores are a good in-
dicator of inadequate food in-
take, poor feeding practices,
disease and infections or a
combination of these.
Weight-for-age Underweight A mixed measure of both
chronic and acute malnutri-
tion
Height-for-age Stunted A measure of chronic malnu-
trition. Stunting may be irre-
versible in children above two
years of age and is associated
with chronic, long-term mal-
nutrition, infection, micronu-
trient deficiency
1 More than two standard deviations below the median of a healthy reference popu-
lation
2011 budget (R189.5 billion) (Republic of South Africa, 2011), with R915 million
of that allocation to the NSNP, the apparent resilience of child undernutrition
requires some explanation.
It is impossible to tell whether or not the programme has been successful
based on simple prevalence statistics. There are a multitude of other trends
that could affect nutritional status in children (e.g. food prices, concurrent
nutritional policy, etc.) Rigorous assessment of the NSNP should be couched
in an understand ng of what the NSNP is actually trying to achieve, as well as
what the possible unintended consequences (good and bad) of the programme
might be. This allows us to scrutinize the policy within the bounds of its
own parameters, while avoiding blinkered analysis ignoring the other potential
consequences of the programme.
At this stage, it is worthwhile reexamining what those explicit objectives
are. First, the focus of the NSNP is squarely on improvement in nutritional
status as a vehicle for improving the ability to concentrate and learn. This
was made explicit after the transfer of the programme from the DoH to the
DoE in 2004, with the only real nutritional guidelines incorporated into the
programme embodied by the Food Based Dietary Guidelines (Republic of South
Africa, 2008; Forster et al., 2001). These guidelines are vague, and do not
make any specific stipulates regarding micronutrient provision, although the
programme does make implicit mention of micronutritional objectives in various
9
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policy documents (Public Service Commission, 2008; Republic of South Africa,
2009, 2008). Second, some attention must be paid to the sustainable gardens
and nutritional education components of the policy, but for the purposes of this
paper those are assumed to be secondary.
The formal objectives of the NSNP exclude improvements in attendance
and enrolment as positive potential outcomes of the program. This is somewhat
strange given the explicit acknowledgements of that particular benefit in the
documentation accompanying similar programmes worldwide. Countries like
Brazil, Bangladesh, Swaziland, India and Jamaica (among others) all strive to
increase enrolment through their school feeding programmes, and the World
Food Program (2002) observes (albeit non-experimentally) that enrolment and
attendance do seem to increase in schools that provide school meals (Vermeer-
sch & Kremer, 2004). This omission is made all the more baﬄing when one
considers that the attendance argument was explicitly included as an objective
within the policy predecessor of the NSNP, the PSNP. Whatever the reason for
this omission in official policy, it is worth recognising this as another potential
benefit, even though it is excluded from the list of official objectives.
If we narrow our assessment to focus on the primary objective of the NSNP,
improving learning ability through protein-energy nutrition, the anthropomet-
rics of particular interest are measures like weight-for-age, weight-for-height or
BMI-for-age based z-scores10. These measures provide more information on
nutritional status contemporaneous with the point at which respondents are
observed than a metric like height-for-age, which reflects chronic malnutrition
(see Table 1). As pointed out at the beginning of this section, there has been
little improvement in these nutritional outcomes since the PSNP was created in
1994.
Data on educational outcomes would also be desirable, but such data is rel-
atively scarce. Ideally, we would like to compare educational outcomes in a way
that is standardised across geographical and temporal locales, as it is challeng-
ing to interpret differences in local educational outcomes that are gleaned from
tests that are constructed within some particular education system at a given
point in time. Comparisons between cohorts subjected to differing curricula
would not be comparable, as they would essentially represent different metrics
for educational achievement with no way of converting one measure to another
(like we would do with, say, kilograms and pounds or centimetres and inches).
The little information that does exist (in the form of internationally compara-
ble standardised tests) suggests that South African schools perform extremely
poorly relative to other countries with similar (or lower) levels of expenditure
on schooling11 (van den Berg, 2007; Taylor, 2011; Glewwe & Miguel, 2008).
10These are generated by checking BMI =
weight(kg)
height(m)2
against referenced, median scores in
healthy populations. Any respondent greater than two standard deviations below the relevant
median z-score is classified as underweight by either of these two measures. There are also
certain relative cutoffs above which the BMI-for-age z-score classifies respondents as obese or
overweight
11See Table 7 in Appendix B for a telling, albeit outdated, inter-country comparison of
standardised mathematics (TIMSS) scores
10
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The NSNP aims to improve educational outcomes by improving nutrition,
but there has been little visible improvement in either of the two areas. Fur-
thermore, the persistence of unequal distributions of these undesirable outcomes
defy the progressive mandate(s) underpinning the formulation of the NSNP.
These provide strong motivators for a rigorous investigation of the programme,
as we need to know if the observed stagnation in social mobility is being driven,
counteracted or unaffected by the NSNP. This requires that we isolate its effect
on nutritional and educational outcomes from treatments external to the pro-
gramme, including time trends and shocks to things like food prices and disease
prevalence. Further impetus is provided by the year-on-year increases in the
value of the conditional grant given to the NSNP. If the programme is failing,
it would be desirable to reallocate funding to something more developmentally
productive. Even if such a reallocation of resources is politically infeasible (the
NSNP has been active for close to 8 years, while the PSNP was around for 10),
it may be worth figuring out where the programme is constrained and attempt
to at least improve it. To the author’s knowledge, there has been no rigorous
quantitative assessment of the NSNP to date.
3.2 The Hypothesised Benefits of School Feeding Programmes
There are two main arguments for the creation and maintenance of school feed-
ing programmes, in general. The first of these is that school meals lead to
improved nutrition, which leads to improved cognition, learning ability and im-
proves educational outcomes. The second is that school meals provide an incen-
tive to attend school in the first place, which is especially valuable in developing
countries that observe high rates of absenteeism (Vermeersch & Kremer, 2004).
The first of these arguments relies on two connections. The first is that
school meals actually improve nutrition, while the second is that there is a con-
nection between nutritional status and educational performance. These links
are difficult to demonstrate non-experimentally because nutritional status, child
health, and schooling are likely to be correlated with various household prefer-
ences, many of which may be unobservable to the econometrician. Independent
results, across various settings, documenting the validity of each of these con-
nections will be briefly explained in no particular order.
There is some experimental evidence of the positive effects of morning nu-
trition on short-term attention and learning ability. Pollitt et al. (1998) review
a set of experiments conducted on nine to eleven year old children subjected
to morning and overnight fasting. These children were then required to sub-
mit to a set of tests aimed at assessing their abilities of recall and ability to
discriminate between visual stimuli. The first two experiments were conducted
on well-nourished, middle class girls and boys in the United States, while the
third was conducted in Huarez, Peru. The children were separated into treat-
ment and control, with treated subgroups served breakfast the morning be-
fore the test and non-treated groups deprived of that breakfast. The children
arrived the night before to ensure that they all began from the same caloric
baseline at the time of treatment. Pollitt et al. (1998) discovered that the chil-
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dren in control groups responded slower to stimulus, made more errors and had
slower memory recall. This effect was more pronounced in groups of children
from the Peruvian group who were less well-nourished than their American
counterparts. Despite these promising results in a laboratory setting assess-
ing one of these connections, experiments that look at the entire causal chain
(School feeding → Improved Nutrition → Improved Educational Outcomes)
are rare.
There is some experimental evidence that school feeding programmes im-
prove nutritional status in a South African primary school children. Napier
et al. (2009) randomly allocate three sets of children age six to thirteen in an
informal settlement in Gauteng and took various anthropometric and biochem-
ical measurements after a time to assess the differences in various nutritional
strategies. In the first group (n=60) children were given a whole wheat pilchard
and spinach vetkoek, in the second (n = 60) children received food according
to the PSNP, whereas in the third group (n=40) children were given fruit. The
study concluded that all three groups had improved significantly on weight-for-
age and micronutritional metrics. The presence of a control group was conspic-
uously absent from this study.
Despite this evidence, it is possible that school m als do not actually im-
prove nutritional status at all. One concern is that there could be intrahousehold
reallocation of resources that arise as a result of the provision of school meals.
Parents may reallocate caloric intake optimally between their children and them-
selves. Jacoby (2002), in an experimental study of the Phillipino equivalent of
the NSNP, provides some convincing evidence that the caloric intake transferred
to treatment recipients is “sticky”. That is, school meals are not perfectly re-
allocated within the household and the recipient of the school meal enjoys the
improved nutritional status afforded by exposure to the treatment. The extent
to which this applies in a South African context requires separate assessment,
as the external validity of the paper hinges on, most notably, cultural norms (in
terms of food sharing customs within the household especially) that are bound
to be contextually unique. For the purposes of this paper, the conclusion of
Jacoby (2002) is less important than the hypothesis, as it has implications for
the interpretation of any econometric assessment of the programme and could
explain why experiments assessing the effects of programmes on education do
not produce positive results.
The second argument is that school feeding programmes increase attendance
and enrolment. The idea is that parents are either more inclined to enrol their
children, enrol their children sooner, or encourage regular attendance in schools
that receive a free or subsidized meal (Vermeersch & Kremer, 2004; McEwan,
2010). Casual observation on the part of the World Food Program (2002) sug-
gests that this is the case, but the causal effect of school feeding programmes
on enrolment and attendance is difficult to pin down econometrically. Schools
that are eligible to receive government programmes are, generally, poorer than
those that are not, so comparing enrolment rates between schools observation-
ally would not really reveal anything about the effect of school feeding pro-
grammes because of selection bias. Schools in which feeding is paid for by par-
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ents are likely to be intrinsically different from those that receive government
programmes, or no school feeding at all (Vermeersch & Kremer, 2004). With
that said, there is at least some positive experimental evidence suggesting that
school feeding programmes positively affect enrolment and attendance rates.
To summarise, the experimental studies that have been conducted assessing
the effects of school feeding programmes on either attendance, enrolment or
educational outcomes (or some mixture) reveal mixed results (see Table 6 in
Appendix B). More specifically, these studies suggest modest, positive returns
on attendance and enrolment and no return to educational outcomes statistically
different from zero (McEwan, 2010).
3.3 Motivation
The NSNP represents an important and potentially valuable tool in the arsenal
of social policy available to the DBE. To make educated allocative decisions re-
garding the funding of the NSNP, it is necessary to have a firm understanding of
the entire array of potential programme effects. Numerous qualitative studies of
the NSNP have been conducted, but even those critical of various aspects of the
policy tend to end on a conciliatory note by casually observing an improvement
in cognition of learners within the programme.
The extent to which these casual observations offer any insight in to the
actual causal effects of the NSNP need to be appraised quantitatively, mediated
by tenacious self-censorship on the part of researchers given the data constraints,
flexible treatment assignment rules, the implications of the results, and the array
of biases that can confound any econometric analysis that strives to make some
causal inference. In the absence of rigorous scientific examination of the policy,
the state is blindly investing a considerable amount of money in a programme
that may not even have any effect, instead of another project that might. Even
if we discover that the programme works effectively, there could be ways to
improve it that can only be uncovered through considered, unbiased assessment.
Given the severity, persistence and regressiveness of both nutritional and
educational outcomes in South Africa, complacently ignoring the potential for
improvement by neglecting to do this is undesirable. Duflo & Banerjee (2011)
succinctly paraphrase Amartya Sen: “poverty leads to an intolerable waste of
talent...poverty is not just a lack of money; it is not having the capability to
realize one’s full potential as a human being. A poor girl from Africa will
probably go to school for at most a few years even if she is brilliant, and most
likely won’t get the nutrition to be the world-class athlete she might have been,
or the funds to start a business if she has a great idea.” The current array
of social policies aimed at affording equality of opportunity along nutritional
and educational dimensions, in line with Sen’s argument (crudely summarised
above), seem to have failed. This latter point provides the strongest motivation
to assess the NSNP of all.
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4 Methodology
4.1 Regression Discontinuity Design12
A regression discontinuity design (RDD) is useful in identifying treatment effects
if the probability of receiving some treatment is a discontinuous function of one
or more of the underlying variables (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). There are two
types of RDD. The first of which is the sharp RDD, which can be seen yielding
a selection on observables kind of estimator, and the fuzzy RDD, which is more
akin to an instrumental variables model (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).
Usually, we are wary of comparing treatment to non-treatment groups in
estimating the causal effect of some policy. However, if there is information
on selection into treatment which is based on an administrative rule that as-
signs that treatment, at least in part, based on some underlying variable, we
have more information on the selection process and can use that information to
derive causal effects quasi-experimentally. Imagine an assignment process that
allocates individuals into a programme if, say, log of income is below a certain
level. The corresponding probability of getting treated would be discontinuous
at that threshold. Figure 1 intuitively illustrates how data generated using this
data generating process would look. The jump in regression lines at the cutoff
point gives RD its name.
Figure 1: RDD Example (Adapted from Cameron & Trivedi (2005))
1.
03
1.
04
1.
05
1.
06
O
ut
co
m
e 
y
1 2 3 4 5
Log Income (Selection Variable)
Actual Data No Treatment
Treatment
Regression Discontinuity Design Example
For the sake of generality, we will refer to the selection variable (log of
12This section closely follows Cameron & Trivedi (2005) and Angrist & Pischke (2009)
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income, in our example) as S with distinct cutoff S¯, for the remainder of this
section. In the sharp RDD case, individuals are assigned to treatment solely
based on the observed and continuous values of S. Those falling below the
cutoff receive treatment (D = 1), and those above do not (D = 0) based on the
measured and deterministic decision rule: Di = 1[Si =< S¯], where i represents
the unit of observation. We further define
E[u|D,S] = E[u|S] (1)
where u denotes the error term in the outcome equation. “Because S is the
only systematic determinant of D, S will capture any correlation between D
and u (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).” If the error term (ui) is correlated with the
the treatment variable (Di) OLS would yield an inconsistent estimator of the
treatment effect α. One solution would be to include some “control” for the
conditional mean function E[u|D,S] in the outcome equation so that
yi = β + αDi + k(Si) + i (2)
where i = yi −E[yi|Di, Si]. If k(S) is specified correctly and is linear, then
we can estimate α as being given by the distance between the two parallel re-
gression lines. This will provide an unbiased estimate of the common treatment
effect if the control function is linear (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). In fact, if
the underlying function is truly linear, the best linear unbiased estimator of
the coefficient on D will be given by OLS. In the more general case of varying
treatment effects, in which α represents E[α|S¯] and k(S) is a specification of
E[u|S] + (E[αi|S] − E[αi|S¯])1[S <= S¯], where 1[S <= S¯] is equal to one if
the condition in square brackets is satisfied, the incorrect specification of k(S)
leads to inconsistent estimators. In other words, if we incorrectly specify k(s)
as a linear function, the inclusion of k(s) will be insufficient in conditioning the
estimation of α on the non-linearity of the error term (i.e. it will not accurately
capture the relationship between the error term and the selection variable). This
problem can be ameliorated by semiparametric specification of k(S).
The general intuition behind RDD is that observations around the cutoff
have essentially the same value for S. Therefore, the sample of individuals
around that cutoff will resemble a properly randomised experiment. Those just
on either side of the cutoff are expected to be similar to one another. The
goal is to compare the conditional means of the outcome variable, y, around
the cutoff point. The choice of interval around the cutoff biases estimates as it
expands, but defining the cutoff as a straight line (the cutoff point) will mean
that Pr[D = 1|S] ∈ [0, 1]. As a result, we need to tradeoff some bias for variance
to draw conclusions from treatment effects estimated in this way (especially if
there is a relationship between the selection variable and the outcome variable).
If it is possible to accurately define the functional form of the relationship
between the outcome and selection variables, we can “use more observations
and extrapolate from above and below the cutoff point to what a tie-breaking
randomised experiment would have shown. This double extrapolation, combined
with exploitation of the ‘randomised experiment’ around the cutoff points, has
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been the main idea behind regression discontinuity analysis (van der Klaauw,
2002; Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).” More formally, in our RDD example
lim
S↑S¯
E[y|S]− lim
S↓S¯
E[y|S] = α+ lim
S↑S¯
E[u|S]− lim
S↓S¯
E[u|S] (3)
Assumption A 1 The conditional mean function E[u|S] is continuous at S¯
Assumption A 2 The mean treatment effect function E[α|S] is right contin-
uous at S¯:
yi = β + αDi + k(Si) + i,
where  = yi − E[y|Di, Si]
These assumptions are a formal statement of the requirement that observa-
tions around the cutoff, S¯, must be likely to have similar average outcomes to
ensure that the result in Equation 3 holds.
Imbens & Lemieux (2008) point out that with sharp RDD, there are no
values of the selection variable for which we observe both treatment and control
variables. In the sharp RDD, the validity of the method relies on our willingess
to extrapolate across covariate values in the neighbourhood of the discontinuity
(Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Figure 2 illustrates how non-discontinuities may
appear to be discontinuous if we do not take care in our specification of k(S).
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Figure 2: Sharp RDD and non-linearity of S (Adapted from Angrist & Pischke
(2009))
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4.1.1 Nonparametric Regression at the Boundary
Estimating α at the cutoff is effectively a nonparametric regression problem
Imbens & Lemieux (2008). This would be relatively simple were it not for the
discontinuity that is, by definition, a single point at the cutoff. This is because
standard nonparametric kernel regression has poor convergence properties at the
boundary, which is always present in this method of estimation. To illustrate
this, let us define two conditional means
µl(x) = lim
S↑x
E[y|S], and µr(x) = lim
S↓x
E[y|S]
Estimated α would be equal to the difference between these two conditional
means with the cutoff point S¯ as their argument,
α = µl(S¯)− µr(S¯)
Using standard nonparametric regression to estimate these c nditional means,
using kernel K(u) with
∫
K(u)du = 1, the regression functions at x can be es-
timated as
µˆl(x) =
∑
i:Xi<S¯
yi ·K(Xi−xh )∑
i:Xi<S¯
K(Xi−xh )
, and µˆr(x) =
∑
i:Xi≥S¯ yi ·K(Xi−xh )∑
i:Xi≤S¯ K(
Xi−x
h )
where h is the bandwidth of the kernel.
This yields the estimator
αˆ = µˆr(x)− µˆr(x) =
∑N
i:Xi<S¯
yi ·K(Xi−xh )∑N
i:Xi<S¯
K(Xi−xh )
−
∑N
i:Xi≥S¯ yi ·K(Xi−xh )∑N
i:Xi≤S¯ K(
Xi−x
h )
This is essentially equivalent to the difference between non-weighted means
of outcomes h units above and below either side of the cutoff. Imbens & Lemieux
(2008) go on to show that this estimator is likely to be biased13.
Instead, this paper employs an RDD that derives estimates based on local
linear regressions on the recommendation of Imbens & Lemieux (2008) and Fan
& Gijbels (1996). This entails fitting linear regression functions to observations
within distance h from the cutoff on either side:
min
βl,γl
N∑
i|S¯−h<Si<S¯
(Yi − βl − γl · (Si − S¯))2
and
min
βr,γr
∑
i|S¯≤Si≤S¯+h
(Yi − βr − γr · (Si − S¯))2
13The technical component of this is detailed in Section C of the Appendix
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which can be used to estimate the values of µl(S¯) and µr(S¯)
µ̂l(S¯) = βˆl + γˆl · (Sˆ − Sˆ) = βˆl
and ̂µr(S¯) = βˆr + γˆr · (Sˆ − Sˆ) = βˆr
the average treatment effect is then given by the difference between these
estimates, or
αˆ = βˆr − βˆl
These local linear regressions are rate optimal and have desirable bias prop-
erties that are preferred to their alternatives (Imbens & Kalyanaraman, 2010).
Given this preference, there is still the question of kernel and bandwidth choice.
As per the recommendation of Cheng et al. (1997), triangle kernels are used
for their favourable boundary properties. Bandwidth choice is informed by the
algorithm developed by Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2010), which is designed to
minimise the mean squared error of the treatment estimator. Note that this is
a gross oversimplification of the technical process of selecting appropriate band-
widths and the technically minded reader is encouraged to consult Imbens &
Kalyanaraman (2010) for a thorough explanation of the derivation of optimal
bandwidth and the properties of their bandwidth choice.
4.2 Other Methodological Considerations
Lee & Lemieux (2009) provide a set of practical guidelines for RDD estimation
that are worth noting. First, RDD can be invalid if individuals can precisely
manipulate their selection variable. Any social programme or grant that assigns
individuals based on need will have some eligibility cutoff (unless the grant or
programme is applied uniformly to the entire population, in which case the
RDD is not applicable anyway). If individuals can perfectly manipulate their
selection variable so that they are just within the treatment group then the
selection effect is not properly dealt with (Lee & Lemieux, 2009).
Second, if individuals can only partially manipulate their assignment, the
variation in treatment is consequentially randomised as if from a randomised
experiment. Even if incentives to qualify for treatment exist (which is highly
likely), this simply means that some individuals are more likely to have values of
S around S¯. Every individual will still have approximately the same probabil-
ity of having a value of S that qualifies them for the treatment Lee & Lemieux
(2009). Understanding this is crucial to understanding the identification strat-
egy employed in this paper.
As an aside, imagine a scenario in which there is a distribution in the abil-
ity to influence selection into treatment across the entire population, which is
positively correlated with S, but treatment is imperfectly predicted by S. This
could occur in a real-life scenario quite easily (imagine someone manipulating
their tax figures, which are recorded as “true” selection variables, in order to fall
below a certain threshold). The likelihood of engaging in attempts to self-assign
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are distributed in a way that is positively correlated with proximity to the cutoff
point (i.e. it is more difficult, and less likely given incentives, for someone far
above or below the cutoff to attempt to self-assign into the treatment), so we
only consider individuals near the boundary. We also assume that the outcome
of interest represents a “good” (higher is better; as opposed to a “bad”) and
that the treatment positively influences the value of yi. Finally, we assume that
those that covertly self-select into treatment still have values of S that place
them within the bandwidth around the cutoff, so as to be included as observa-
tions in the calculation of the RDD estimate using our local linear regression
approach.
If there is a positive relationship between actual treatment status and the
selection variable the RDD estimator of treatment effect can be interpreted as
an upper bound. This is because individuals that self-assign to the left of the
cutoff will drag the conditional mean up (and those to the right would drag it
downwards). We would expect the most likely misspecification of treatment to
occur at values of S that are extremely close to S¯. Given that we are comparing
individuals near the cutoff on the basis that they are extremely similar, their
partial ability to self-select into treatment should not bias the RDD estimator
a huge amount, if at all. This hypothetical situation essentially relates RDD
estimates in the presence of deviations in treatment assignment from the values
of S relative to S¯, and has direct implications for the interpretation of the results
summarised in Section 5.
Third, RD designs can be analysed and tested like randomised experiments.
If variation in the treatment near S¯ is approximately randomised, all the charac-
teristics of the respondents in that area should be roughly the same. A violation
of this is the same as non-continuity of covariates at the threshold and further
implies that the identifying assumption that individuals cannot perfectly ma-
nipulate the assignment variable is violated. We can test whether or not this
assumption holds be checking sets of relevant covariates at the selection variable
threshold. This point represents the key implication of the local randomisation
results (Lee & Lemieux, 2009).
4.3 Data
The National Income Dynamic Study (NIDS) is the first ever South African
national panel study. The data employed in this analysis comes from the first
wave, which was conducted throughout 2008, although primarily in the first half
of the month (91% of adult respondents were interviewed between February and
June). This dataset is particularly suited to the purpose of this investigation as
it contains a large sample of children (n = 9616) and includes anthropometric
information that can be used to calculate various z-scores.
The NIDS sample survey design is a two-stage cluster type with stratification
by district council. The primary sampling units (PSUs) are drawn from the
master sample provided by Statistics South Africa, with households then are
drawn from that subsample of PSUs. Design weights were calculated as inverse
to the probability of inclusion, which entails a two-stage calculation. In the first
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stage, the probability of sampling each PSU is calculated, and in the second, the
probability of sampling each household within each PSU in the NIDS sample is
calculated. The latter corrects for unit non-response.
The post-stratification weights adjust the design weights in such a way that
age-sex-race marginal totals match 2008 midyear population estimates, con-
strained by the requirement that province population should correspond to the
official provincial population statistics released within that same set of midyear
estimates. These weights were also calculated with respects to the constraints
that total population equal 48,687,000 and that each individual within a par-
ticular household is weighted the same.
The task of estimating the effect of the NSNP is bound by a number of
constraints in the data. Most importantly, the basis upon which the NSNP
is assigned differs from any units of observation (aggregated and individual)
in our dataset. Furthermore, assignment into treatment groups (by electoral
ward) is done on the basis of poverty score calculation, which is not observed.
The DBE proved reluctant to communicate their calculation methods, and the
exact calculation methods (to the knowledge of the author) are not contained
within any publicly available policy documentation. Although we have some
information on the poverty score calculation (it is based on the rank of mean
household income, literacy and unemployment by electoral ward), attempts at
mimicking this assignment would be beset by issues given the mismatch between
the level of aggregation at which that poverty score is actually calculated and
the available geographic specifications available in the data. The 400 PSUs
drawn in the NIDS sample are pulled from a total sample of 3000 PSUs in the
master sample, but there are 4277 electoral wards, in total, in South Africa. By
the pigeonhole principle, at least some clusters will contain multiple wards. This
mapping could be more complicated if PSUs partially contain multiple wards,
with other parts of those wards contained in other PSUs. Even if this was
not the case, the actual calculation of poverty scores could be weighted more
towards some of its determining variables than others, which would render our
approximation of the actual poverty score inaccurate. Moreover, the NNSSF
(detailed in Section 2.4) allows for exceptions to the poverty score to assignment
mapping. As a result, a proxy for school quintile based on schooling fees was
employed, and the value for the top of the third quintile was calculated as
our base cutoff point. The implications of the use of this imperfect proxy are
discussed in the following section and influence how the results are interpreted
in Section 5.
Variables were also constructed to reflect a number of anthropometric z-
scores including weight-for-age, height-for-age and BMI-for-age. This was done
using a Stata macro, developed by de Onis et al. (2007), which constructs growth
curves for school-aged children and adolescents that accord with the similarly
calculated WHO child growth standards (World Health Organization, 2006).
This helped illuminate a missing data issue in the NIDS, as a combination of unit
non-response for the weight/height component of the survey (which required the
respondent to be measured and weighed by a fieldworker) and measurement er-
ror for those height and weight variables mean many Z-scores were discarded.
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The macro has an automatic process of discarding bogus observations if they fall
outside the range of plausible human dimensions, so these measurement issues
effectively reduce the sample size of our final estimation. This measurement
error and non-response appears uncorrelated with any major demographic vari-
ables, and the unit non-response is “ignorable” (it can be corrected for using
post-stratification weights).
4.4 Identification Strategy
For the RDD to be a plausible identification strategy, we need the selection
variable to have error components that are continuously and stochastically dis-
tributed, which will occur if agents do not precisely sort around the discontinuity
threshold. If this holds, then variation around the discontinuity cutoff will be
“as good as randomised” Lee & Lemieux (2009). Assessing the plausibility of
this requires us to think about the correlation between school fees and the true
selection variable (poverty score), as well as the precision with which individuals
and local ward administrators vary each of those selection variables. Further-
more, we also have to consider the ability of individuals to choose the ward in
which they live.
In the NNSSF, the logic of assigning schools to quintiles by electoral ward
turns on those wards acting as school catchment areas. Individuals do select
their living areas (within obvious constraints), and can therefore precisely ma-
nipulate their assignment into treatment if they really want to. Given the
multitude of benefits (proximity to work, family, schools, markets, transport),
costs (crime, pollution) and constraints that enter into the decision to live in a
certain area, it is implausible that individuals precisely vary their selection into
treatment near the boundary. The likelihood of this is also related to the extent
to which individuals know which areas contain schools that receive the treat-
ment. If we consider that the proclivity of individuals to precisely manipulate
their treatment status is a determined by
• the magnitude of the importance of being in a quintile three or below area,
relative to other determinants of choice of living area
• the information set of the decision maker
the assumption that individuals do not precisely sort into treatment in this
way seems plausible.
A potential threat to this could be if individuals live in wards that do not
receive the treatment (and are socioeconomically better endowed in a way that
is reflected in the outcome of interest), but send their child or children to poorer
quintile schools to enjoy the benefits of the treatment. Again, the decision to
send a child to a certain school is multifaceted, with its own array of costs,
benefits and constraints. It is unlikely that fourth quintile parents would deem
the benefits of the treatment (if they are even aware of them) worth the transport
costs and lower expected standard of schooling. Assignment into quintile three,
in 2008, only qualified the school for inclusion in the NSNP (that is, did not
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afford the benefits of any other incentivising treatments), although the inclusion
in quintile three does qualify schools for more funding. As a result, the only
likely motivation for parents near the cutoff to precisely sort below it would be
inclusion in the programme or access to a better funded school. The implications
of this for our RDD estimates could be that fewer poor children are included in
treatment, and they would probably have higher baseline z-scores.
Acting against this threat are a number of economically intuitive relation-
ships. First, transport costs would mean that only individuals physically proxi-
mate to treatment areas would be likely to send their children into other wards to
receive the treatment. Second, given that the demarcations of quintile area are
essentially arbitrary, the distribution of socioeconomic status between nearby
houses is more likely, in reality, to be closer than that assignment suggests. As
a result, individuals that find it worthwhile to send their children into another
quintile are likely to be close to the socioeconomic status of those living in that
quintile anyway, given that they would need to be proximate to make the travel
worthwhile. This argument is undermined by the proximity of the household
to cheap, fixed-cost forms of public transportation, but even then the cost of
transportation would be roughly the same as the value of the provided meal.
This could be offset by the commensurate reduction in fees likely to be ob-
served in those lower quintile schools (something upon which our RDD partially
depends!), but this undermines the notion that individuals can precisely sort
around the discontinuity threshold. This discussion of potential trade-offs high-
lights how selection into treatment through school choice is quickly swarmed
by a set of other considerations that go into that decision. If this argument
holds, the covariates around the cutoff are likely to be continuous and the RDD
estimation strategy valid.
Another potential fragility of this identification strategy is the ability of
the coalitions of school administrators to self-select their wards into the treat-
ment. If the provisos outlined in Section 2.4 are granted often, this might prove
especially problematic. This is because coordination between local education
administrators and political shrewdness may be correlated with the ability to
provide other services. Given that the NSNP and extra funding embody the set
of returns to schools designated within the third quintile in 2008, the extent to
which this is a problem turns on the ease with which wards are granted exemp-
tion and the extent to which local administrators are motivated to qualify for
inclusion in quintile three. This marks the strongest challenge to successful iden-
tification, as these administrators are not varying their selection variable (the
poverty score) to get into treatment, but self-assigning to treatment through
other means.
Given the above detailed set of caveats, we turn to an assessment of the
extent to which the fees variable is likely to correspond to the true selection
variable. The true poverty score is essentially a measure of the socioeconomic
status of the electoral ward. Given our ignorance of the poverty score calcula-
tion procedure, we need to find some way to check if the fees within an area are
correlated with the average household income of that area. Although electoral
wards are smaller than the clusters in the NIDS, these clusters are the small-
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est level of geographic aggregation available. To get an idea of the extent to
which fees correlate with average income within a community, we can examine
the correlation as summarised by the graphic in Figure 3. The hope is that
the individual units of observations are geographically corralled in an arbitrary
way. Of course, this is not necessarily true given that certain policies (including
the NSNP) are assigned to administrative areas, but this is the best available
strategy given the data constraints. Clearly, there is a strong positive correla-
tion between the average wealth of the geographic area and the average school
fees paid in that area. The fees variable was chosen as our selection variable
(as opposed to household income) because of the likelihood of electoral wards
being heterogeneous to some extent. School fees may provide a localised approx-
imation of the socioeconomic status of the surrounding area and, as a result, a
better approximation of the quintile assignment of that area. It is also hoped
that they accurately reflect the quintile of the school more accurately given the
exceptions to the rule detailed in Section 2.4. Implicit in the use of this fees
variable is a strong assumption that demand for schooling is not altered by the
programme in a way that leads to a commensurate increase in fees.
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Figure 3: Fees and Income by Cluster
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It was necessary to invoke a set of qualitative arguments for the use of fees
as a proxy variable for the poverty score assignment of electoral ward, but
the actual process of identifying the treatment effect in the RDD is based on
whether or not we observe continuous, stochastic errors in the selection variable
employed. If we can safely assume that school fees approximate the poverty
score of the ward and rule out precise selection around the discontinuity, our
identification strategy is valid and we can let the data speak for itself. Note that
the precise self-selection arguments made above relate only to instances in which
wealthier individuals, or wealthier wards, precisely sort into the treatment. If
this is implausible, we can interpret any observed discontinuity as equivalent to
the local average treatment effect for the programme that we would observe in
a randomised experiment.
5 Results
Table 5 and Figure 4 represent the results of our RDD estimates, with the
sample limited to those children that attend school primary school (i.e. have
non-missing values for their fees variable and are eligible to enter school given
their age). The cutoff was originally specified at the top of the quintile three,
but checks were performed around that cutoff given the imperfect relationship
between the true selection variable and school fees. Near the top of the third
quintile (a quarter of a standard deviation below, to be precise), there is evi-
dence of a discontinuity in both z-scores. Given that treatment quality is het-
erogeneous, and given the likelihood of the selection variable imperfectly cap-
turing assignment into treatment, the discontinuity gap can be interpreted as
the weighted-average, intention-to-treat effect across all individuals Imbens &
Lemieux (2008) of a magnitude roughly equal to -.5 for both z-scores. Given
that those below the cutoff are those exposed to the treatment, there appears to
be some evidence that the NSNP has a positive effect on nutritional outcomes.
These results are robust to alternative specifications of kernel and bandwidth,
which are detailed in Tables 8 and 9 in Section D of the Appendix.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES -.75 s.d -.5 s.d -.25 s.d Top of 3rd Quintile +.25 s.d +.5 s.d
Weight-for-age Z-score 0.599 -0.297 -0.455* -0.257 -0.132 0.470
(0.466) (0.237) (0.234) (0.213) (0.265) (0.289)
Observations 657 657 657 657 657 657
BMI-for-age Z-score 0.331 -0.371 -0.528** -0.106 0.161 0.189
(0.296) (0.236) (0.208) (0.230) (0.307) (0.294)
Observations 764 764 764 764 764 764
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 4: Graphical Represention of RDD
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Table 2: Check for Household Income Discontinuity
(1)
CUTOFF -.25 s.d
Log HH Income -0.0979
(0.149)
Observations 994
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To appraise the validity of these results, we need to check for discontinuities
in other continuous variables that may “jump” at the same cutoff for fees. The
most likely is household income (for reasons outlined in Section 4.4). Table 5
below summarises the regression discontinuity results for this check, which are
not significantly different from zero.
6 Discussion
The above results suggest that the NSNP does have some effect on weight-for-
age and BMI-for-age z-scores. These are interpreted as reflecting the extent to
which the respondent is underweight (for low scores) and overweight (for high
scores). In the absence of data on educational outcomes, we cannot necessarily
interpret this as meaning that the NSNP causes improved educational outcomes
or conclude that the school feeding component of the programme is responsible
for this observed treatment effect unless we invoke other studies that may not
be externally valid (and are, therefore, perhaps not applicable to this context).
As a result, these results merely represent the first step in rigorously assessing
whether or not the programme achieves its objectives and must be interpreted
cautiously, as there are a number of factors that could render the identification
strategy imperfect. First, it is difficult to understand exactly why the cutoff is
slightly below where we would expect. This may be attributable to the use of
a proxy for the actual selection variable that is likely to be imperfect. Given
our inability to test the relationship between school fees and the true selection
variable, this remains an open question.
One possible explanation is that the presence of fee exemptions (total or
partial) falsely includes a number of respondents on the “wrong side” of the
discontinuity. As such, we have a number of false positives that are distributed
in a way that only weakly influences the actual estimate. This would mean
that the third quintile of the fees variable would not perfectly correspond with
the third quintile of the poverty score and would shift our cutoff point slightly
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to the left. This is but one of many potential explanations for this given the
inexactness of our proxy.
More worrying would be if there was some unaccounted for covariate dis-
continuity biasing our estimates. It could even be that the discontinuity is
unobservable given the available data. This poses the greatest threat to the
validity of these results. For reasons of precise selection outlined in Section 4.4,
we might expect to see some sorting of better nourished children to the left of
the cutoff. If this is being driven by something other than household income,
which we have tested for discontinuity at this point, our estimates cannot be
interpreted as equivalent to a randomised experiment as some selection effect is
preserved. This, in conjunction with the nebulous, essentially untestable rela-
tionship between proxy and true selection variable, demand that these results
are treated with some scepticism.
Ideally, we would have the true selection variable and information on actual
school quintiles, as well as information on educational outcomes. NIDS is set
to release a second wave of data that is meant to track the same individuals
through time. Furthermore, the second wave release is set to coincide with the
release of a new version of the first wave dataset that contains information on
school quintiles. This would allow us to properly check which respondents are
actually within the treatment.
Future research into the effectiveness of the NSNP would also require that
investigators acquire poverty score calculation information. On paper, this in-
formation is supposed to be freely available in line with the transparency goals
enumerated in the NNSSF. Anecdotally, and in the experience of the author,
acquiring this information is not simple. Government officials are either reluc-
tant to release it or unaware of the actual underlying calculation process. It is
possible that more information on poverty score calculation will become avail-
able soon after the release of the new version of the South African census, which
was conducted in late 2011. The release of this data will prompt the DBE to
recalculate the poverty score (as per the instructions of the NNSSF). The hope
is that this poverty score calculation process will get properly documented.
If such data could be obtained, a fuzzy RDD could be employed as we
would not only have a selection variable (the poverty score), but information on
compliance as well. This would not only tighten up the identification strategy,
but allow researchers to test the levels of non-compliance (or the extent to
which wards are sorted into quintiles on the basis of something other than the
ward poverty score). For this to work, one would need to obtain information
on electoral wards in the NIDS. This data (and even GPS data on respondent
location) exists, but is confidential. At the time of writing, the NIDS team were
preparing for the release of the second wave, which is a labour intensive process.
As a result, it was not possible to timeously acquire the necessary clearance to
access this confidential data.
Even in the absence of the release of data on school quintiles, if one were to
combine the GPS data in the confidential NIDS and the Education Management
Information Systems (EMIS) data, which has GPS coordinates for each school,
it might be possible to map respondents to schools in a way that exploited
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information gleaned from differencing the GPS coordinates of proximate schools
and the household (or something similar). The EMIS also has information on
particular schools that could be conducive to a thorough evaluation of the NSNP.
Conspicuously absent from our analysis thus far are considerations of at-
tendance and the “flypaper effect” observed by Jacoby (2002). This is simply
because these relationships are untestable given the data limitations. Ideally,
we would be able to assess the full suite of policy objectives and implications in
our analysis to develop a rounder picture of the entire process.
7 Conclusion
Further research employing alternative methods of investigation like the ones
detailed above are needed to add to the results detailed in this paper. Although
this investigation represents a promising, if shaky, first step toward properly
assessing the effectiveness of the NSNP, data constraints, identification chal-
lenges and myriad other issues leave the analysis open to a number of criticisms
(which this paper has attempted to acknowledge throughout). As a result, the
results contained herein should be interpreted as suggestive and are meekly in-
terpreted as indicative that the programme, as a whole, has a positive effect on
weight-for-age and BMI-for-age related nutritional outcomes.
The function of this paper is less geared towards the treatment effects esti-
mated herein, and more towards the succinct communication of relevant policy
components and identification challenges that could inform any further analysis
of the programme. The goal was to create a paper that provided a starting
point or baseline from which further analysis into the effectiveness of the NSNP
could be conducted. Given the dearth of rigorous econometric analysis of the
programme, the increasing amounts of money invested in the NSNP and the
intransigence of educational and nutritional outcomes in the face of attempts
at improving the living conditions of the poorest South Africans, this further
research is imperative. Summarily, the hope is that this paper provides a spring-
board for further research into the topic and aims to adhere to the maxims of
evidence based policy change and collaborative research which have increasingly
become hallmarks of a modern microdevelopmental literature that emphasises
the verisimilitude and internal validity of experimental and quasi-experimental
methods.
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A
Table 3: Department of Healths provincial targeting strategies for
identifying vulnerable schools (Source: Kallmann (2005))
Province Criteria
Eastern Cape
• All learners in all farm schools
• Grade R learners to Grade 4 learners in ’needy’ primary schools
• Targeting guidelines, indicators/criteria not given
Free State
• Priority given to:
– farm schools
– schools in informal settlements; and
– schools in small towns
• Use percentage of learners paying development funds (school fees)
and other donations as indicators to identify ’needy’ schools
• Feed all learners in targeted schools
Gauteng
• Invite all registered primary schools to apply.
• All primary schools that apply receive school feeding.
• Teachers identify needy children based on criteria such as financial
status and nutritional status.
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Table 3: Department of Healths provincial targeting strategies for
identifying vulnerable schools (Source: Kallmann (2005))
Province Criteria
Kwazulu-Natal
• Feed in farm and rural schools and schools in informal settlements.
• Feeding in township schools takes place according to the following
criteria:
– Majority of children come to school hungry.
– High absenteeism rate.
– Majority of learners are unable to pay school fees.
– Majority of learners are not able to bring food boxes to school.
– Learners come from homes that depend on a social grant for
survival.
– General lack of concentration and participation in school ac-
tivities.
Limpopo
• Feeds all learners in rural a peri-urban schools
Mpumalanga
• Feed schools in poverty-stricken areas, including farming, rural,
deep rural and informal settlement areas.
• Use indicators and departmental assessments in collaboration with
Department of Education:
– social problems;
– unemployment;
– disease;
– poor school performance; and
– dropping out
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Table 3: Department of Healths provincial targeting strategies for
identifying vulnerable schools (Source: Kallmann (2005))
Province Criteria
Northern Cape
• Give priority to rural schools.
• Feed all learners in participating rural schools.
• Phasing out urban schools/feed only 50% of learners in participat-
ing urban schools.
• Use results of 1994 anthropometric survey in primary schools to
identify ’needy’ schools
North West
• Schools in geographic areas with a poverty level of 70% and above
are eligible for school feeding.
• Schools in areas where the poverty gap is below the cut-off point
(70%) but where there are pockets with poverty gaps of 70% or
more are identified through a nutrition situation analysis taking
into account community inputs/discussions and variables such as:
– nutritional indicators;
– vital statistics; and
– household food security indicators
• All rural and farm schools and schools in informal settlement areas
are potentially eligible to school feeding.
• The poverty gap is applied in a realistic and flexible manner, i.e.
the cutoff point is not applied strictly and in isolation to other
variables.
• The maximum number of children to be fed is limited to the bud-
get available, using the following formula: School feeding bud-
get/number of feeding days/standardised cost = maximum number
of children to be served.
• The number of feeding days or quantity and quality of menu op-
tions will not be compromised to feed more children. Doing this
would adversely affect the impact of school feeding.
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Table 3: Department of Healths provincial targeting strategies for
identifying vulnerable schools (Source: Kallmann (2005))
Province Criteria
Western Cape
• Schools are targeted according to the classification of the Poverty
Index, used by the Department of Education
• The Poverty Index classifies schools on a scale of 0 to 1, with 1
being the most impoverished
• The province feeds all the learners in the poorest schools (which
includes all rural and farm schools), half the children in slightly
better-off schools, and a quarter of the children in the remaining
schools with a poverty index above the threshold of 0.5.
B
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Figure 5: BMI-for-Age
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Figure 6: Height-for-age
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
De
ns
ity
−5 0 5
Z−Score (Height−for−Age)
Africa Coloured
White
Height−for−age Z−score Distributions by Race
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
De
ns
ity
−5 0 5
Z−Score (Weight−for−Age )
Quintile 1 Quintile 2
Quintile 3 Quintile 4
Quintile 5
Height−for−age Z−score Distributions by HH Inc. Quint.
38
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Figure 7: Weight-for-age
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Table 7: Mean mathematics and reading achievement, TIMSS and PIRLS stud-
ies (Source: Glewwe & Miguel (2008))
Country Mathematics (TIMSS) 1999 Reading (PIRLS) 2001
Grade 7 Grade 8 Grade 4
Japan - 579 -
UK (England) - - 553
US - 502 542
Argentina - - 420
Belize - - 327
Chile - 392 -
Colombia - - 422
Indonesia - 403 -
Iran - 422 414
Jordan - 428 -
Korea (South) - 587
Kuwait - - 396
Malaysia - 519 -
Morocco 337 - 350
Philippines 345 - -
South Africa - 275 -
Thailand - 467 -
Tunisia - 448 -
Turkey - 429 449
C
C.1 Approximate Bias of the Simple Nonparametric Es-
timator Using a Rectangular Kernel
The approximate bias of the simple nonparametric estimator with bandwidth h
can be best illustrated by taking the probability limits of each of the conditional
means for treatment and control estimated under the special case in which we
employ a rectangular kernel. Formally
plim[µˆr(S¯)] =
c+h∫
c
µ(x)f(x)dx
c+h∫
c
f(x)dx
= µr(S¯) + limx↓S¯
δ
δx
µ(s) · h
2
+O(h2)
If this is combined with the corresponding probability limit of the estimated
conditional mean of the control group, we can derive the bias
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plim[µˆr(S¯)−µˆl(S¯)]−µc(S¯)−µl(S¯) = h
2
·(limx↓S¯
δ
δx
µ(x)+limx↑S¯
δ
δx
µ(x))+O(h2)
The above equation shows that the bias is linear in bandwidth h, whereas
nonparametric regression estimates in the interior of the support typically yield
bias of order h2. Furthermore, given that the parenthesised part of the first
term is unlikely to be zero if the cutoff rule is correlated with the outcome,
which is likely, the bias for the simple kernel estimator is likely to be quite high
(Imbens & Lemieux, 2008).
D
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Table 8: RDD Estimates for Different Bandwidths
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WEIGHT-FOR-AGE -.75 s.d -.5 s.d -.25 s.d Top of 3rd Quintile +.25 s.d +.5 s.d
Recommended BW 0.599 -0.297 -0.455* -0.257 -0.132 0.470
(0.466) (0.237) (0.234) (0.213) (0.265) (0.289)
Half BW 0.487 -0.0683 -0.405* -0.305 -0.185 0.725**
(0.567) (0.267) (0.242) (0.239) (0.387) (0.366)
Double BW 0.341 -0.336 -0.428* -0.240 -0.0930 0.445
(0.441) (0.223) (0.225) (0.209) (0.255) (0.284)
Observations 657 657 657 657 657 657
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BMI-FOR-AGE -.75 s.d -.5 s.d -.25 s.d Top of 3rd Quintile +.25 s.d +.5 s.d
Recommended BW 0.331 -0.371 -0.528** -0.106 0.161 0.189
(0.296) (0.236) (0.208) (0.230) (0.307) (0.294)
Half BW 0.702** -0.285 -0.559** 0.0274 0.0114 0.352
(0.343) (0.257) (0.227) (0.292) (0.431) (0.363)
Double BW 0.142 -0.387* -0.490** -0.0947 0.0311 0.186
(0.280) (0.218) (0.199) (0.212) (0.226) (0.281)
Observations 764 764 764 764 764 764
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: RDD Estimates for Rectangular Kernels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CUTOFF -.75 s.d -.5 s.d -.25 s.d Top of 3rd Quintile +.25 s.d +.5 s.d
Weight-for-age Z-score 0.763 -0.251 -0.390 -0.270 -0.0854 0.370
(0.479) (0.242) (0.239) (0.210) (0.260) (0.288)
Observations 657 657 657 657 657 657
CUTOFF zbfa zbfa zbfa zbfa zbfa zbfa
BMI-for-age Z-score 0.233 -0.331 -0.544*** -0.0851 0.237 0.143
(0.307) (0.239) (0.211) (0.225) (0.285) (0.299)
Observations 764 764 764 764 764 764
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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